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Abstract 
We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on 
owner-operators (as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis 
begins by ruling out differences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that 
standard hypotheses in organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice 
of organizational form in US industry, also apply in Europe.  We then argue that the preference 
for subcontracting over vertical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions—
particularly, labor regulation and tax laws—that increase the costs of vertical integration.   
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1. Introduction 
The organization of freight transactions has been the subject of several recent studies.
1  These 
studies, however, have focused exclusively on US firms and have not sought to evaluate the 
applicability of theories of organization to freight transactions outside the US or to explain 
observed differences in contracting and organization practices between countries.  In trucking, 
for example, US carriers are much larger on average and much more likely to use employee 
drivers than are European carriers, who rely more heavily on “owner-operators”—independent 
contractors who own and drive their own trucks.  Thus, whereas the average number of 
employees per carrier in the US was 14.7 in 1997, the average European carrier employed only 
3.9 workers in 1998, with as few as 2 workers per carrier in Spain.  Firms with 10 or more 
employees represented 26% of the market in the US compared to only 5% in the EU.
2  And while 
the top eight US trucking companies accumulated 12% of 1997 US market revenue, the top ten 
EU firms collected less than 8.5% of the industry’s revenue in 1998.  More striking than these 
differences in firm size and employment patterns, the estimated proportion of drivers who own 
and operate their own trucks is 22 to 30% for US carriers (with revenues greater than one million 
dollars) but 60 to 75% in Europe.
3  
In this paper, we seek to explain differences in firm size and contractual patterns observed in 
the US and European trucking industries.  We begin by ruling out two potential explanations—
differences in technology and transaction costs—and conclude that differences in institutional 
environments, especially labor and tax laws, provide the most likely explanation for the observed 
disparities.  In section 2, we describe briefly the activities of carriers and the contractual 
problems and arrangements typically found in trucking, compare the two most common types of 
organization—hierarchy and subcontracting—and discuss how the institutional environment 3
affects the relative merits of these organizational forms.  In section 3, we use data on trucking 
organization in Spain to show that the governance of freight transactions in Europe is sensitive to 
the same transaction cost considerations that have been shown to affect those decision in the US.   
Section 4 relates the observed disparities in organization to differences in the institutional 
environment and, especially, to differences in labor and tax regulations that raise the cost of 
integration in the EU.  The article concludes with a summary of its contributions and 
implications.  
2. Technology, transaction costs and governance structures   
Trucking is organized everywhere around the same types of assets and transactors.  Basic 
assets are the truck and the human capital of the driver. Transactions start when a shipper needs a 
cargo to be moved from one place to another.  The shipper either may ship its cargo itself using 
an internal fleet of trucks—a so-called “private carrier”—or it may contract for this movement 
with a “for-hire” carrier, who specializes in supplying transportation services.  For-hire carriers, 
in turn, either may hire company drivers to operate carrier-owned trucks or may subcontract with 
self-employed owner-operators who own and drive their own trucks.  When working for a 
particular carrier, both owner-operators and company drivers perform the same tasks, including 
customer service if necessary.
4  
This description is common to both Europe and the US, with no significant differences in 
technology between these two areas.  Manufacturers of trucks and control systems export their 
products worldwide.
5  Routes are also similar, especially with the increase in international traffic 
in Europe as a result of greater European integration over the last two decades. It would thus 
appear that trucking uses essentially homogeneous technologies in the US and Europe. Whatever 4
differences in technology might exist certainly seem too small to account for the substantial 
differences in trucking organization actually observed.
6 
American and European freight transactors also face a common set of organizational 
problems.  On the one hand, carriers and drivers face a moral hazard problem in inducing 
appropriate effort and care by drivers.  Shippers may inform carriers about punctuality and 
delivery problems, but carriers may find it difficult to monitor other dimensions of driver 
performance. Drivers are dispersed, and some dimensions of effort, such as fuel consumption, 
tire wear, mechanical breakdowns, truck care and accident avoidance, are difficult to contract 
over.
7  
Driver ownership of the truck—as is the case with owner-operators—addresses many of 
these moral hazard problems.  First, owner-operators have higher-powered incentives to exert 
effort because their rewards are fully tied to performance both in driving and using the truck. 
Second, they hold both the decision rights on how the truck is used and a residual claim on their 
trucks’ value. Thus, they bear the consequences of their decisions on non-contractible dimensions 
such as the use of the truck and ancillary resources such as fuel, tires and so forth, reducing moral 
hazard relative to using employee drivers.
8   
Using owner-operators also incurs transaction costs, of course. In addition to the potential for 
misallocation of exogenous risks to the relatively risk-averse party, driver ownership of trucks 
may expose the parties to hold-up problems in the presence of specific assets (Williamson, 1975, 
1979; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).  The most obvious situation involves the use of 
specialized vehicles such as refrigerated vans, car carriers, and similar special-purpose trucks.  In 
the case of trailer trucks, which can be divided into a tractor unit and a trailer, only the trailers are 
specialized while tractor units can generally be employed with various types of trailers.  Even 5
though owner-operators can use their vehicles to contract with any carrier or shipper, they are 
likely to have more difficulty finding an alternative user for a specialized vehicle than for a 
general freight one.  Conversely, a contracting firm in need of a specialized trailer is likely to find 
it harder to find a substitute operator quickly than would a shipper or carrier requiring a standard 
dry van.  Similar short-term hold-up opportunities may also arise where efficient hauling requires 
highly idiosyncratic drive-train configurations.  From a technical point of view, there is an 
optimal drive-train configuration for each kind of haul (depending on the distance and weight). 
An incorrect configuration can lead to a 10-20% increase in total costs.
9  Because specialized 
vehicles and vehicles with nonstandard drive-trains are less numerous, drivers who own and 
operate such vehicles, and carriers or shippers who require their services, have fewer contracting 
opportunities, creating a short-term appropriable quasi-rent derived from the costs that parties 
suffer if delays occur.
10  
Finally, hold-up problems may also arise because of intangible assets obtained as a by-
product of the relationship between drivers and carriers or because of timing needs.  Information 
about routes, customer characteristics, vehicles, services offered by carriers, and communication 
systems are valuable pieces of knowledge that are costly to transfer.
11 Punctuality in contractual 
performance may be extremely important when, for example, a carrier wants to be able to serve 
urgent and unforeseen orders, offering a reliable service, or when it is committed to “just-in-
time” delivery schedules. The cost of non-performance is then particularly high, so that 
appropriable quasi-rents arise if the carrier relies solely on owner operators.  
Vertical integration can be a solution to the hold-up problem. Company drivers agree on 
compensation and general working conditions, and the carrier decides on the shipper, hauls and 
destinations. In the case of physical assets, truck ownership eliminates the hold-up problem, as 6
shown for this industry by Hubbard (2001).  For human assets and timing requirements, hierarchy 
is likely to provide better solutions than contracting for synchronization and designation 
problems, such as those needed to offer reliability of delivery in JIT services.
12  
Summing up, the choice of organizational form results from balancing two opposing forces. 
First, misalignment of incentives and the lack of contractibility are best solved by allocating 
truck ownership to the driver. This will push the optimum solution towards the market, with 
carriers relying more on owner-operators. Conversely, specificity and some coordination 
problems push in the opposite direction. Both the potential appropriation of quasi-rents and the 
mis-assignment of hauls among owner-operators can be attenuated through vertical integration, 
leading carriers to rely more on company owners. The preferred arrangement will depend on the 
relative strengths of these forces. 
3. Employee Drivers versus Owner-Operators in Spain 
To see whether truck ownership and driver status conforms to transaction cost predictions 
outside the US, we analyzed a sample of 262 for-hire truckload carriers consisting of the largest 
Spanish firms in terms of sales.
13  For our purposes, we defined the degree of vertical integration 
by the ratio of owned trucks to total trucks (the sum of company owned and operator-owned 
trucks) managed by each carrier.  As our principal measure of asset specificity, we created a 
dummy variable, SPECIFICITY, with a value of one for firms identified as carrying cargos other 
than “general freight.”  These “non-general freight” firms include carriers that specialize in 
transporting cars, construction machinery or other oversized freight (requiring flatbed trailers), 
powders, foodstuffs or dangerous materials (shipped in refrigerated and tanker trailers).  
Although not all specialized assets need be specific nor all specific assets specialized, for reasons 7
described in the previous section, we expect a correlation between specialization and specificity 
in trucking. As an attempt to capture the kind of specificity associated with idiosyncratic drive-
train configurations (following Nickerson and Silverman, 2003a), we also include a dummy 
variable, INTERNATIONAL, for firms that carry international freight (in this case, to 
destinations outside Spain), the argument being that hauls that traverse national borders are on 
average longer than within-country hauls and, following Nickerson and Silverman (2003a), 
require relatively atypical drive trains.  
Finally, as a proxy for the difficulty of monitoring drivers’ effort, we use the variable 
CARRIER SIZE, measured by the number of vehicles managed, based on the assumption that 
monitoring drivers’ performance and truck use becomes more difficult as the number of trucks—
and, with it, the variability of hauls and destinations—a carrier manages increases.  Since 
employee drivers have weaker direct incentives, larger CARRIER SIZE should differentially 
increase the costs of integration and lead to greater reliance on owner-operators.   
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables are contained in tables 1 and 
2, respectively.  Table 3 reports results for two specifications of the model.  Results in the first 
column were obtained using ordinary least squares.
14  The results are consistent with the 
hypotheses; all coefficients have the expected signs, and two (SPECIFICITY and 
LOG(CARRIER SIZE)) are statistically significant.  Because the dependent variable is a 
proportion and because there are a significant number of observations at the limits (84, of which 
8 take a value of 0 (no integration) and 76 take a value of 1 (complete integration), we re-
estimated the model as logit with grouped data (see Greene, 1997, pp. 894-896).  The results, 
reported in the second column of Table 4, are similar to those using OLS: Vertical integration of 
trucks is more likely for specialized trailers and in small carriers.  Using the results in column 2, 8
the proportion of carrier-owned trucks increases by 14 percentage points, to .79 for specialized 
trailers from .65 for standard vans at the mean values of the other variables.  An increase in 
CARRIER SIZE from 20 to 91 trucks (representing the 25
th and 75
th percentiles), meanwhile, 
decreases the percentage of owned trucks from 79% to 68% (again at the mean values).  
Although we do not find that Spanish carriers hauling freight outside of Spain are significantly 
more likely to use carrier-owned trucks in our data, this may be due to the particularly tenuous 
nature of INTERNATIONAL as a proxy for the need for idiosyncratic drive trains that we hoped 
to capture.  
4. Influence of the Institutional Environment 
As noted earlier, the technology of trucking in developed countries is substantially the same.  
At the same time, the results of the preceding section show that governance form in Spanish 
trucking is sensitive to the type of factors shown to affect trucking organization in studies using 
US data (mainly asset specificity and measurement costs).  Yet the proportion of owner-operators 
in Spain is substantially greater than in the United States—60-75% in Spain versus 22-30% in the 
US.  Since neither technology nor firm-level organizational factors appear to explain this 
disparity, it makes sense to consider whether and to what extent institutional differences may be 
responsible for observed differences in the governance of Spanish and US trucking firms.  
Differences in the institutional environment may act as “shift parameters,” in Williamson’s 
(1991) terminology, that affect the relative cost of governance forms in a way that cause 
otherwise similar transactions to be organized differently. 
Two leading candidates for that role are differences in tax and labor regulations.
15  Tax rules 
clearly are able to alter the relative costs of the organizational alternatives.
16  Governmental 9
programs seeking to help small firms and the self-employed through tax breaks directly favor 
fragmentation because large, vertically-integrated firms are not eligible for the benefits. In 
addition, taxes can promote fragmentation indirectly to the extent, for example, that small firms 
and, especially, self-employed workers find it easier than larger firms to reduce their tax burden 
by means of tax avoidance and evasion.  Labor regulations can also alter the relative costs of 
integration and contracting in a number of ways.  Regulations protecting job security, for 
instance, may raise the cost of hierarchy by making termination of employee drivers more 
difficult (Bronars and Deere, 1993; Caballero and Hammour, 1998), increasing the likelihood of 
judicial review and requiring more costly record keeping.  Legal constraints on permissible 
compensation arrangements, such as the use of performance-related pay, can also affect the 
choice of organizational form by limiting the options for motivating employees within the firm 
compared to subcontractors.   
This interpretation of taxation and labor law as shift parameters is consistent with the 
observed differences between the institutional environments of the US, Spain and other EU 
countries. First, important differences exist between Spanish and US tax rules. According to the 
OECD, Spain had one of the largest governmental schemes for subsidizing self-employed 
workers and small firms in the OECD countries at a time when the US was seeing only the 
beginning of a demonstration project (OECD, 1992, p. 175; 1994, p. 7).  And whereas the burden 
of taxation in the US remained at around 29% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1980 to 
1992, Spain’s tax burden reached 35.8% of GDP in 1992, up from 24% in 1980, a 46.6% increase 
(Gago and Álvarez, 1995, pp. 83-84).  To the extent that larger firms find it harder to reduce their 
burden of taxation than do small firms and self-employed workers, the growth in taxation would 
have tended to increase the relative cost of vertically-integrated Spanish carriers.  10
Differences in Spanish and US labor regulations appear to operate in the same direction. 
Under Spanish labor law, layoffs and dismissals are subject to regulatory or court approval and 
trigger high, mandatory dismissal compensation (up to 45 days per year worked with a maximum 
of 42 months’ salary).
17  Under US labor law, by contrast, firms generally have much more 
discretion to terminate employees “at will.”  Spanish labor law is also more favorable to unions, 
with the result that Spanish trucking is much more heavily unionized than in the US.  Finally, 
Spanish regulations restrict night and “weekly holiday” work, and fix a minimum of 22 days of 
annual leave and minimum additional pay for overtime.
18 The World Bank’s Doing Business 
2004 report found that, as of 2003, Spanish employment regulations were less flexible than those 
of any other OECD country except Mexico and Portugal.  In the report’s index for employment 
rigidity, Spain scored 70 compared to the EU average of 50.5 and US score of 22.
19  Based on 
such assessments, institutional constraints on employment relations appear among the highest in 
Spain, with the EU as a whole in the middle and the US at the bottom, suggesting that integration 
costs are higher in Spain than elsewhere.
20   
The relationship between the change in owner-operator use and labor regulation in several 
EU countries provides additional evidence supporting our argument.  Table 4 compares levels of 
labor regulation in nine EU countries in the mid-eighties with the percentage of carriers with 
fewer than six vehicles from 1980 to 1990.  Since all countries have similar economic and 
technological development, evolution in governance forms should be similar. However, Table 4 
shows that firm size has changed substantially in countries with relatively flexible labor 
regulations while in those with more rigid rules the change has been negligible.  
The relationship between these variables is shown in the scatter plots in Figures 1 and 2. The 
vertical axis represents the change in owner-operator use, and the horizontal axis is, in Figure 1, 11
the index of job security provisions and, in Figure 2, the ranking of labor disputes.  Although 
there are too few observations for meaningful statistical tests, the figures suggest a positive 
correlation between changes in the use of owner-operators and the rigidity of labor regulations.  
In particular, countries that are high in the rankings for job security provided by labor regulation 
and labor disputes (France, Italy and Spain) have changed their structures very little. Conversely, 
countries with more flexible regulations have moved faster towards less fragmented and larger 
carriers.  This pattern is consistent with empirical studies of other industries that also attribute the 
prevalence of Spanish subcontracting to institutional constraints (González-Díaz, Arruñada and 
Fernández, 1998; Arruñada and Vázquez, 2003).  
5. Conclusion 
Substantial differences exist between US and European trucking carriers. European carriers 
are much smaller and use mainly owner-operators as drivers while US carriers are bigger and rely 
more heavily on employees to drive company-owned trucks.  These differences do not appear to 
be the result of differences in technology, and governance choices appear to be influenced by 
similar factors on both continents: Our quantitative evidence suggests that carriers are more 
likely to own their own trucks when there are important hold-up problems related to the existence 
of specific assets and when monitoring drivers is relatively easy.  Differences in institutional 
environments, particularly in labor regulation and tax systems, between the EU and US appear to 
be responsible for much of the difference by raising the cost of integrated organization.   
Conventional economic analysis of the European trucking industry emphasizes fragmentation 
as a problem in itself and focuses on the large percentage of tiny carriers and owner operators 
with just one truck.
21  The concern that small carriers cannot reach economies of scale has led to 12
the calls for the adoption of policies that promote vertical integration.
22 An implication of our 
findings for public policy is that removing institutional impediments may be a more effective 
way of encouraging integration than is creating new rules rewarding the integration of owner-
operators, as has been attempted in some European countries.  We note, however, that the 
existence of economies of scale does not necessarily call for conventional vertical integration, or 
hierarchy.  Efficiencies can instead be reached by contractual means and hybrid forms.
23 Our 
results hint that policies promoting vertical integration are misguided because, instead of 
resolving the causes of the problem, they focus on its consequences.  13
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Description Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum
INTEGRAT  Ratio of owned trucks to total
trucks managed 
0.72 0.28  0  1 
SPECIFICITY  Dummy variable: 1 if a 
carrier is dedicated to 
specialized freight; 0, 
otherwise  
0.53 0.50  0  1 
CARRIER SIZE  Number of vehicles managed 
(sum of company owned and 
operator-owned trucks); 0, 
otherwise  
92.7 238.98  6  3,553 
INTERNATIONAL  Dummy variable: 1 if a 
carrier ships international 
freight; 0, otherwise 
0.41 0.49  0  1 22
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
INTEGRATION SPECIFICITY  LOG(CARRIER 
SIZE)  INTERNATIONAL 
INTEGRATION  1.0000 -  - - 
SPECIFICITY  0.2263 1.0000  -  - 
LOG(CARRIER SIZE)  -0.2734 -0.0249  1.0000  - 
INTERNATIONAL  0.0204 -0.2078  0.0869  1.0000 
 23
Table 3. Factors explaining vertical integration, measured by the ratio of owned trucks to total 
trucks managed by carrier 
Variable OLS  estimation  Logit 























2  13.13  
Equation test statistic  13.00
** (F[3, 258])  13.43
** (χ
2[3]) 
Sample size  262  262 
Source of data: Logística & Transporte (1999, vol. 53, 46-73). 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the  0.01 level. 24
Table 4. Changes in fragmentation in European trucking 
Country  Ranking in terms of job 
security provisions 
b 
Ranking in terms of 
 labor disputes 
c 
Change in percentage of the 
number of carriers with 1-5 
vehicles (1980-1990) 
a 
1. France  6  7  +2.00% 
2. Italy  9  8  About 0 
3. Spain  7  9  -0.16 
(1984-1992) 
4. Sweden  5  6  -4.21 
(1972-1990) 
5. UK  3  5  -4.60 
6. Germany  4  1  -6.31 
7. Denmark  1  4  -6.38 
8. Belgium  8  3  -9.54 
9. Netherlands  2  2  -11.94 
Sources: 
a Source: For Spain, information from Metra/Seis (1967, 57-58), CSTT (1974, p. 10), MTTC (annual surveys, 
several years), and MOPT, taken from UPGC (1992, p. 62).  For the US, information from US Bureau of the Census 
(1998, SIC 241, Table 6, 1992, SIC 241, and 1987, SIC 421).  And for other European countries, from Bayliss 
(1986, p 171), Kritz (1974, p. 11), EC (1996, p. 57), and EC (1994, p. 44). 
b 1 is for the country with fewest job security provisions, and 9 is for the country with most. Based on Bertola (1990, 
p. 853, Table 1). Spain does not appear in Bertola’s ranking so its position has been estimated from tables in 
Emerson (1988) who uses the same tables as Bertola to build his ranking. 
c 1 is for the country with fewest labor disputes, and 9 is for the country with most. Based on the number of working 
days lost per 1,000 employees: Annual average 1988-1997 (except France: 1988-1996). Office for National 
Statistics (Britain) . 25
Figure 1. Ranking in terms of job security provisions in relation to changes in 










































































































Source: Table 4.  
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1 Palay (1984), Phillips (1991), Pirrong (1993) explain the governance of different freight 
transactions based mainly on asset specificity and, to a lesser extent, uncertainty and frequency. 
Nickerson and Silverman (2003a) also test specificity but add coordination difficulties in their 
analysis of less-than-truck-load trucking. Lafontaine and Masten (2002) question the importance 
of specific investment and highlight the importance of costly pricing.  Finally, Hubbard (2000, 
2001 and 2003) and Baker and Hubbard (2003a and 2003b) show the importance of 
contractibility, quasi-rents, job design, coordination problems and measurement issues, 
understood as bargaining costs and performance assessment. 
2 Sources: for the US, Bureau of the Census (1997), for the EU, Spanish Ministerio de 
Fomento and Arthur Andersen (2000, p. 32).  28
 
3 The use of different criteria leads to different numbers, but these differences do not affect 
our argument. See, for the US, American Trucking Association (1997) and Nickerson and 
Silverman (2003a, p. 92); for Europe, IRU (2001, p. 8). 
4 We focus on for-hire carriers because this is the largest activity. Almost all private carriers 
are small businesses that have only one or two vehicles, generally of small size. (See MTTC, 
1990, UPGC, 1992, and MOPTMA, 1993, for Spanish data.) Larger manufacturers and retailers 
integrate only a small percentage of the vehicles they use—they generally subcontract most of 
them (Bossard Consultants, 1992, and CEL and Andersen Consulting, 1992, p. 95). 
5 The world’s two biggest heavy-truck makers (DaimlerChrysler and Volvo) are Europeans 
and sell their trucks in the US. Their combined 2002 market share was 59% in the US and 47% in 
Spain (Fahey, 2003, and El Mundo Motor, 2002). 
6 This does not mean that the organization of trucking is unaffected by technology. On the 
contrary, as shown by Baker and Hubbard (2003a and 2003b), information technology has been 
applied to trucking in two waves with a different impact on organization. The first generation of 
devices, which were mere ‘trip recorders,’ allowed employers to monitor drivers more accurately 
and led to the increased use of company drivers and private carriers. On the contrary, the second 
generation devices were full-fledged on-board computers and GPS location systems, which, by 
facilitating coordination, led to an increase in the reliance on owner-operators and for-hire 
carriers. A second example of the influence of technology is the growth of just-in-time delivery 
systems which, by creating new hold-up problems, made vertical integration and repeated 
subcontracting more attractive. 29
 
7 Moral hazard in trucking has been analyzed in detail in the literature, making further 
comment unnecessary. See, for example, Hubbard (2000), Lafontaine (2000), Lafontaine and 
Masten (2002), Nickerson and Silverman (2003a) and Baker and Hubbard (2003a and 2003b). 
8 Incentive problems also arise in connection with carriers’ decisions when allocating good 
and bad hauls among owner-operators. These conflicts are attenuated with some contractual 
patterns, such as minimum guarantee miles, but seem to cause substantial bargaining costs.  
However, these costs do not seem highly relevant in choosing between company drivers and 
owner operators because they do not differ much in these two cases under the standard incentive 
system—they are more a consequence of compensating drivers for measured performance than of 
the legal form of the transaction. See Lafontaine and Masten (2002).   
9 Estimations are based on fuel efficiency data shown by Nickerson and Silverman (2003a, p. 
97). Compare Lafontaine and Masten (2002, p. 5), however.  
10 The problem is related to “temporal specificity”, the term used by Masten, Meehan, and 
Snyder (1991) to identify the costs derived from the difficulties of finding new suppliers of 
resources at short notice. 
11 Goodson (2000, p. 1) estimates average turnover costs for the US at $3,000 per driver. This 
cost is probably higher in Europe due to tighter labor regulation, especially for drivers under an 
employment contract. 
12 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991 and 1994), Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and 
Williamson (1991). Nickerson and Silverman (2003a) find some support to this argument in 
trucking.  30
 
13 See Logística & Transporte (1999, vol. 53, 46-73). 
14 In a test for heteroskedasticity, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic errors (Breusch-Pagan test = 5.4184). 
15 The influence of the institutional environment on organizational form has been studied 
recently, among other works, in González-Díaz, Arruñada and Fernández (1998), Arruñada and 
Vázquez (2003), Nickerson and Silverman (2003b) and Lafontaine and Oxley (2004).  
Additionally, many other works have analyzed the effect of labor regulation on unemployment, 
wages, hiring and firing patterns, unionization and so on. Recent example are Heckman and 
Pagés (2000), Oyer and Schaefer (2002) and Botero et al. (2003). 
16 OECD (1992, 178-182) provides some empirical evidence. See also Blau (1987), 
Pissarides and Weber (1989, p. 28), and McDonald, Dwyer and Wendt (1994, p. 7). 
17 These were firing costs over the period analyzed in the paper (1980-1990). In 1997 they 
were reduced to 33 days per year worked with a maximum of 24 months’ salary. 
18 These substantial differences in labor regulation are well documented in the literature. For 
example, Emerson (1988) and Bertola (1990) showed these differences in the mid-eighties.  For a 
comparison between labor regulations in Spain and other European countries and those in the US, 
see also Freeman (1994), who concludes that government regulation of the workplace, 
centralized wage bargaining, unionization, job stability, and non-wage labor costs are higher in 
Europe than in the US.  
19 See World Bank (2004) as well as Botero et al. (2003). These indicators are analyzed in 
Arruñada and Vázquez (2004).  31
 
20 See Corsi and Grimm (1989) and Corsi and Stowers (1991). In industries that did not have 
such a high self-employment rate as trucking, European firms reacted to the increasing 
constraints on the employment relationship by substituting self-employed workers for employees 
(OECD, 1992). 
21 Among others, Irrisarri (1987), Peña (1991), CECAM (1992, p. 31), and García Alcolea 
(1992).  
22 As, for example, in Spain, through Royal Decree 1136/1997 and Ministerial Decree 
1939/1997.  
23 See, generally, Williamson (1991), and, about trucking, Fernández, Arruñada and 
González-Díaz (2000). 